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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

EDWENA M. ARENDS,
Appellant,
-vs DEPARTMENT OF
SECURITY, AND
REVIEW OF THE
COMMISSION OF

EMPLOYMENT
BOARD OF
INDUSTRIAL
UTAH,

Case No. 11830

Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Petitioner brought this action pursuant to
Section 35-4-10, U.C.A. 1953, to review respondents'
decision of August 27, 1969 denying petitioner's claim
to unemployment compensation.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
This is an appeal to review the determination by
the Industrial Commission of Utah that the petitioner
failed without good cause to accept a referral to
suitable, available work and that petitioner be disqualified for two weeks benefits for that refusal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petitioner seeks an order reversing the Board of
Review's decisions and an award of benefits for June 1,
through June 14, 1969 in accordance with the provisions
of Chapter 4 of Title 35, U.C.A. 1953.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner lived at 121 First Avenue and was
employed full time as a secretary and receptionist
for Pacific Flight Support at 940 West 1st South, Salt
Lake City, Utah, beginning June 24, 1968 (R. 14, 16).
There was public bus transportation to this location
and she was also able to walk.

Because of a reduction

in force by her employer her position was terminated

on February 4, 1969 and she filed a claim with the
Deparbnent of Employment Security (DES) on February 19,
1969 (R. 14).
by

On March 28, 1969, petitioner was hired

the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad at the Roper

Yards, 21st South and 6th West in Salt Lake City

(R. 14-15).

Since there were no buses or other public

transportation to that location, petitioner had to
drive her own car to this employment (R. 15).

She

occasionally experienced problems with the car when
returning home from work (R. 15).
-2-

It was not a

dependable car (R. 12, 15).

Plaintiff married while

working for this employer (R. 15).

This employment

was terminated May 9, 1969, because the employer felt
the petitioner was "not suitable for the assignment"

(R. 15).

Petitioner again contacted the Department

of Employment Security (DES) for benefits and employmer
references.

On June 4, 1969, the DES gave petitioner

a referral for the following day to the Hi-Land Dairy
at 700 Vine Street in Murray, Utah for a permanent
position as a secretary at the prevailing wage (R. 15,
29).

Petitioner called the Hi-Land Dairy on June 5,

1969, before going for the scheduled personal interview

(R. 26).

On the phone, petitioner discussed the job

and other circumstances for employment with Hi-Land
including the actual location of the employment
(R. 26, 24, 16).

After determining the location of

Hi-Land to be in Murray, Utah, at 49th South and
7th East, petitioner declined the employment (R. 16, 261
Petitioner then called DES to inform them of her
decision to seek employment within the city limits
of Salt Lake City so that she might resort to walking
or the use of public transportation whenever her car
gave her problems as it had at Roper Yards (R. 16, 26,
12).
7

The next day Employment Security Office referred
petitioner to Terracor at 529 East South Temple in
Salt Lake City -- less than one mile from petitioner's
residence at 121 First Avenue (R. 12, 16).

Petitioner

was hired by this employer and has driven and walked
to this employment (R. 12, 16, 17).
On the basis of petitioner's refusal to accept
employment with Hi-Land Dairy at 700 Vine in Murray,
Utah, the Department of Employment Security on June 23
denied petitioner six weeks benefits from June 1, 1969
through July 12, 1969 (R. 28).

Upon review, the

Adjudication Section felt the facts justified a
reduction in the denial benefits from six to two
weeks from June 1, 1969 through June 14, 1969 (R. 25,
21).

Upon further appeal by petitioner the appeal
referee noted that the facts of this case including
the non-dependability of petitioner's car and the
distance she would have been required to drive if she
had accepted the Hi-Land Dairy employment were taken
into consideration when the original six week denial
of benefits was reduced to only two weeks of dis(R. 20, 21).

The Appeals Referee,

did find as his conclusion of law:

That the claimant failed without good
cause to accept a referral to suitable
available work offered her by the Em- '
ployment Office. 35-4-5(c) U.C.A. l953
(R. 21).
The Board of Review of the Department of Employment
Security affirmed the decision of the referee on
27 August 1969 (R. 4).

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AND THE
BOARD OF REVIEW IMPROPERLY APPLIED THE
PROVISIONS OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
ACT TITLE 35 CHAPTER 4 u.c.A. l953 TO THE
FACTS OF THIS CASE.
Respondent bases the denial of benefits to
petitioner solely upon a portion of Section 35-4-5(c)
U.C.A. 1953 which states:
An individual shall be ineligible for
benefits • • . If the Commission finds
that • • • he [petitioner] has failed
without good cause • • • to accept a
referral to suitable work when offered
him by the employment office. (R. 21).
Such ineligibility shall continue for
the week in which such failure occurred
and for not less than one or more than
the five next following weeks as determined by the commission according to the
circumstances in each case.
-5-

The determination by respondent must be upheld if,
when the evidence is looked at in the light most
favorable to the findings, there is evidence of any
substance whatever which can reasonably be regarded
as supporting the determination.

Conversely, a

reversal of that determination can be justified if
there is no substantial evidence to sustain the
determination and there is proof of facts giving
rise to the right of compensation so clear and persuasive that the refusal to accept it and make an
award was clearly capricious, arbitrary, and
unreasonable.

Gocke v. Wiesley,

18 Utah 2d 245,

420 P.2d 44, (1966); Kennecott Copper Corp. Employ.

v. DES, 13 Utah 2d 262, 372 P.2d 987 (1962);

Martinez v. Board of Review, DES,

2d

(1970:

The record discloses the following:
l.

Petitioner was given a job referral by the

Placement Office on June 4 with Hi-Land Dairy (Hi-Land
at 700 Vine Street (4900 South) (R. 15, 20, 29).
2.

Petitioner telephoned Hi-Land Dairy on June

5, 1969 (the day scheduled for interview by the

Placement Office) and discussed the job and location

of Hi-Land with that employer (R. 16, 24, 26).
-6-

3.

Petitioner, after discussing the job with

Hi-Land on the telephone, informed that employer that
she would not take that job because it was too far
from her home (R. 16, 26).
4.
on June

Petitioner telephoned the Placement Office

s,

1969 after contacting Hi-Land Dairy to

inform them she would not be taking Hi-Land Dairy
position because it was in Murray, Utah and too far
from her home (R. 16, 20, 26, 29).
Respondents maintained petitioner should be
denied benefits because she failed without good cause
to accept a referral to suitable, available work.
Petitioner disagrees with that legal conclusion, based
on the record as a whole, which adequately shows the
petitioner did accept the referral to Hi-Land, by
telephoning to discuss the work and other circumstances
of employment with Hi-Land.

During that conversation

with Hi-Land petitioner learned the actual location
of Hi-Land Dairy.

Petitioner did not fail to accept

the referral as alleged by respondent but instead
based upon her discussion with Hi-Land, she was able
to make a rational judgment that the employment would
not be suitable in view of the circumstances.
-7-

POINT II
THE RSCORD AND FINDINGS OF FACT I'll' NCYT SUSTAIN
THE DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL
THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH 35-4-5(c)
U.C.A. 1953.
The purpose of Unemployment Security Act in Utah
is to establish financial reserves for the benefit of

persons unemployed through no fault of their CMn.
The provision of the statute (35-4-5) disqualifying
employees from employment compensation is to prevent
workers from obtaining benefits where there is work
available and suitable which they decline to accept.
Lexes et al v. Industrial Commission et al.,

121 Utah

551, 243 P.2d 964 (1951); Olof Nelson Construction

Company v. Industrial Corronission et al, 121 Utah 525,
243

p. 2d 951 (1951).
However, 35-4-5(c) does not require an individual

to accept every available, suitable employment opportuni ty offered him by the Employment Security Office
to be eligible for benefits provided by the Act.

He

is disqualified from receiving benefits only if he

"failed without good cause" to apply for or accept
available, suitable work.

"Good Cause" as a justifi-

cation for refusal was discussed by the Court in
p. 561 where it was concluded that "good cause"
-8-

as used in the act means such "cause" as would justify
a reasonable person in leaving his work.
This court states that the Employment Security
should be liberally construed to best effectuate
its purposes of meeting the needs of unemployed
workers.

First, it is to enable them to find suitable

v1ork; second, it is to provide cash benefits during
pericx:ls of unemployment.

To be eligible for these

benefits a claimant must act in good faith and make
an active and reasonable effort to secure employment
and findings by the DES should relate to the reasonableness of these efforts.

Gocke v. Weisley, 18 Utah

2d 240, 420 P.2d 44(1966).

Other jurisdictions require "good cause" in a
context of unemployment statutes to be based on real,
not imaginary, substantial not trifling, and reasonable,
not whimsical circumstances; there must be some compulsion produced by extraneous and necessitous circumstances.

The standard is one of reasonableness as

applied to the average person.

Burroughs v. Employment

Agency, 86 Idaho 412, 387 P.2d 473 (1963),
81 C.J. s. Social Security and Public Welfare § 167

Pp. 253, 254.

Personal factors are to be included

in determining "good cause" for refusing offered

emplo)n"Ilent within meaning of statute.

Swanson v.

Minneapolis -Honeywell Regulation Co., 240 Minn. 449,
61 N.W. 2d 526, 53'.?(1953).

A study of the cases yields the conclusion that
the standard of t1good cause" in each case is to be

based upon the subjective determination by a reasonable
man in the same circumstances with the vitalizing
element of ''good cause" being good faith.
The record shows petitioner refused to accept
possible employment by Hi-Land Dairy in Murray, Utah
when she informed that potential employer he was too
far from her residence to insure she could find
reliable, adequate transportation.

Although she con-

:.,idered moving closer to that employer she felt it
would be more suitable to obtain emplo)n"Ilent in Salt
Lake City, where she was registered with the DES,
since she lived close to the center of the business
district and would be able to walk or bus to work
whenever her car failed her.

Her assessment of the

of having an undependable car and living
in the business center of Salt Lake City with her
husband led her to decline the offer of employment
in Murray.

She was then free to accept a position

at least close enough that she could insure promptness

and reliability in reporting daily for work.

That

is what she did the next day when, upon referral,
she accepted a position with Terracor in

Lake

,:ity.

Petitioner's sole reason for refusal of the
Hi-Land Dairy position was the location of that
employer and that she had no reliable suitable transportation to that location.
Other jurisdictions have ruled on the effect of
lack of transportation on eligibility for unemployment benefits when an individual refuses to accept
a position he feels is too far from his residence.
These cases have generally denied benefits when a
claimant refuses work which would require him to
furnish transportation, even if he has none available.

Copeland v. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm.,

197 Okla 429, 172 P.2d 420

(1946); Rabinowitz v.

Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 177 Pa.
Super. 236, 110 A. 2d 792 (1955); Zupanic Unemployment
Comp. Case,

186 Pa. Super. 252, 142 A 2d 395 (1958);

Huiet v. Wallace, 108 Ga. App. 208, 132 S.E. 2d 523
(1963), Moya v. Employment Security Commission, 80
N. M. 3 9, 4 50 P. 2d 92 5 ( 196 9) •

However, these cases can all be distinguished
from the one at bar on their facts and the issues
presented.

Most of these cases base the denial of

benefits upon the fact that claimant did not reside
in a corrununity where any suitable available work
existed and he therefore needed to be able to transport
himself a distance which would bring him into the
sphere of the general labor market so that he could
become part of the general work force "available for
work".

Once he was able to transport himself to an

area where he became "available for work" he was
eligible for compensation.

Salt Lake City is not such

a community lacking secretarial and receptionist
employment opportunity.

Contrariwise, the majority

of positions for which petitioner is qualified are
in the central business district within a mile of
petitioner's residence.

She was not detached from

the general labor market when living at 121 First
Avenue and there was no need for her to go into
another corrununity to seek suitable, available work.
She lived in the area of greatest concentration of
secretarial jobs in the State of Utah.
-12-

The other cases deny benefits when the lack of
transportation claim by an employee evidences lack
of sincerity or good faith in the refusal of suitable
available employment.

Petitioner has not demonstrated

any bad faith or malingering.

a compensated vacation.

She was not looking for

Instead she was acting as a

reasonable person to insure she would always be present
for work and on time for any job she accepted.

She

\vas willing to accept any position in which she could
serve her employer reliably.

Her decision to refuse

employment with Hi-Land was based on a reasonable
assessment of the circumstances and the alternatives.
The reasonableness of her decision is evident from the
fact she was employed the next day on a referral from
the DES to a

position in Salt Lake City.

The DES recognizes distance to work and transportation are factors to be considered by an employee
when appraising a job opportunity.

Although the

Section review stated only that the
facts of the case justified a reduction in the denial
of benefits from six weeks to two weeks, the Appeals
Referee corrunented that this reduction was due to a
consideration of the distance petitioner would have
-13-

had to travel.

"Good cause" must always ultimately

be based upon the subjective factors and circumstances surrounding a claimant and, admittedly, it
is not always easy for respondent to determine.

But the respondent must have compelling and reasonable
evidence to deny benefits to any claimant who has
demonstrated a reasonable, subjective and good
faith "good cause" for refusing employment.

There

is no substantial evidence in the record to support

a determination that petitioner "failed without good
cause 11 to accept offered employment.

Conversely, the

record abundantly expresses elements sufficient and
necessary to establish ngood cause" as delineated
by

Utah law.
CONCLUSION
The law requires petitioner to show

for refusal of available suitable work.

11

good cause"

The record

shows she had "good cause 11 for refusal of the Hi-Land
Dairy position on June 4, 1969 and, therefore, should
be granted the unemployment compensation benefits
applied for by her.
Respectfully submitted,
RONALD N. BOYCE
Attorney for Petitioner
431 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 841J

